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* 
The French Ban on Religious Symbols 
On 10 February 2004, by an overwhelming majority, the French National Assembly voted to ban 
state school pupils wearing obvious religious symbols, including large Christian crosses, Jewish 
skull caps, Sikh turbans and headscarves, such as the Islamic Hijab on school premises.
1 The ban 
was approved by the Senate on March 3
rd, and will come into force in time for the beginning of 
the new school year in September 2004.
2  
While the proposed ban has aroused controversy throughout Europe and beyond, there has been 
little consideration so far given to the question whether, if the ban is enacted, it can successfully 
survive European legal challenge in the French and European courts. The existing case law on the 
subject in national supreme courts such as the Judicial Committee of the House of Lords, the 
British supreme court, and the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German supreme court, does not 
provide much comfort to the French authorities. In each case, although for differing reasons, these 
supreme courts have rejected as disproportionate absolute prohibitions on the wearing of clothing 
suffused with religious symbols, such as headscarves and turbans. 
More worrying still for the French authorities is the recent adoption by the European Community 
of two directives on discrimination on grounds of race and ethnic origins and discrimination on 
grounds of religion or belief. This Community legislation, together with the provisions on 
religious freedom in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, is likely to result in a formidable 
legal challenge for the new legislation as soon as it comes into force.  
Even the weaker protection offered by the European Convention of Human Rights is likely to 
present the French state with a further legal obstacle to a successful defence of the new law. 
                                                 
* Associate Research Fellow, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, and Senior Lecturer in Law, Centre 
for Legal Research, Nottingham Law School (alan.riley@ntu.ac.uk). 
1 Given that the text of the bill focuses on obvious religious symbols, ‘Dans les écoles, les collèges et les lycées 
publics, le port de signes ou tenues par lesquels les élèves manifestent ostensiblement une appartenance 
religieuse est interdit’, small stars of David and Christian crosses worn round the neck are likely to be 
compatible with the new law. The legality of permitting ‘small’ religious symbols but not ‘larger’ ones is 
discussed below. 
2 The current text was approved by the Senate on 3 March 2004. See Projet de loi relatif à l'application du 
principe de laïcité dans les écoles, collèges et lycées publics (vendredi 3 mars 2004). The website link can be 
found at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/12/dossiers/laicite.asp 2 | ALAN RILEY 
 
European Community Anti-Discrimination Law 
In 2000 the European Community enacted two anti-discrimination directives, the Council 
Directive 2000/78/EC
3 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in employment and 
occupation, which prohibited discrimination in respect of age, disability, orientation and religion. 
A second Council Directive, Directive 2000/43/EC
4 implementing the principle of equal treatment 
in respect of racial and ethnic origins. Member states may delay implementation of the age and 
disability provisions until December 2006. All the other discrimination provisions should have 
been implemented into national law by December 2003. 
At first sight, any discrimination assessment of the French law should take place in relation to 
Directive 2000/78/EC, as it applies to discrimination in respect of religion and belief. However, 
that directive only applies to discrimination in employment and occupation. It does extend to 
vocational training and therefore probably applies to vocational courses taking place in schools 
and colleges. As a result of the Directive’s narrow scope, it is unlikely to be the principal legal 
challenge to the French law. The impact of this directive is discussed further below. 
Directive 2000/43/EC by contrast has a much broader scope: it prohibits direct and indirect racial 
and ethnic discrimination in employment and occupation, but also in relation to the provision of 
goods and services by private and public sectors, including education.
5 Furthermore, there are 
very strong grounds for arguing that the phrase ‘race or ethnic origin’ can be applied to protect 
religious groups who share the same racial or ethnic origins. 
Given that the Community has very little case law on racial or religious discrimination, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) is likely to draw upon the case law of the member states to assist 
in the interpretation of the race and general framework directives. In this regard the ECJ is likely 
to give considerable weight to the British case law, as the United Kingdom has the most 
developed case law on racial discrimination of the 25 member states. Of particular relevance is the 
approach of the British courts as to the proper scope of racial discrimination legislation. 
In Mandla v. Dowell Lee, the House of Lords, the British supreme court, ruled that the protection 
afforded by the Race Relations Act of 1976 could be extended to certain religious groups.
6 In that 
case, the Court was faced with a situation in which a Sikh had been refused a place at a private 
school because the school authorities refused to permit the appellant to wear a turban. The case 
focused on the issue of whether the Sikhs were a group defined by their ethnic origins. The Court 
held that term ethnic origins was broader than a strictly biological or racial definition. The Court 
took the view that for a group to constitute an ethnic group in the sense of the 1976 Act it must 
regard itself and be regarded by others, as a distinct community by virtue of certain 
characteristics. The identified characteristics were 1) a long shared history of which the group is 
                                                 
3 Council Directive 2000/78/EC of 27 November 2000 establishing a general framework for equal treatment in 
employment and occupation. The provisions in respect of religious discrimination were to be brought into force 
by national law by 2 December 2003. 
4 Council Directive 2000/43/EC of 29 June 2000 implementing the principle of equal treatment between persons 
irrespective of racial or ethnic origins. The directive is to be brought into force by 19
th July 2003. 
5 There is an argument as to whether the Community can in fact adopt broad anti-discrimination legislation in 
respect of race or ethnic origins and religion or belief. The argument is that the Community has no general 
competence to legislate in such areas. That argument is further supported by Article 149 (4) which explicitly 
excludes harmonisation in the field of education. However, there is a powerful alternative view that Article 13 
grants the Community express powers in respect of discrimination matters, and to that extent acts as a lex 
specialis. It is likely that faced with a legal challenge under this directive the French government will seek to 
challenge its legal basis. 
6 [1983] AC 548. HEADSCARVES, SKULL CAPS AND CROSSES – THE EUROPEAN LEGALITY OF THE FRENCH BAN | 3 
 
conscious as distinguishing it from other groups and the memory of which keeps it alive; and 2) a 
cultural tradition of its own, including family and social customs and manners, often but not 
necessarily associated with religious observance. In addition, a number of other characteristics are 
relevant, such as a common geographical origin or descent from a small number of common 
ancestors; a common language not necessarily peculiar to the group; a common literature peculiar 
to the group; a common religion different from that of neighbouring groups or from the general 
community surrounding it; being a minority or being an oppressed or a dominant group within a 
larger community.
7 
This approach of bringing certain religious groups who can demonstrate they have distinct ethnic 
origins within British race discrimination legislation has significantly extended the protection of 
that legislation to Sikhs and Jews.
8 The British courts so far have failed to find that Muslims are 
able to provide sufficient evidence of specific ethnic origins to obtain protection from direct 
discrimination. However, the courts have provided protection for Muslims as a matter of indirect 
discrimination.
9 Furthermore, some academic commentary argues that Muslims could provide 
sufficient evidence of distinct ethnic origins to meet the Mandla criteria.
10 
Given there is very little Community case law on the issue, the ECJ is likely to give significant 
weight to the views and approach of the House of Lords to the definition of race and ethnic origin. 
The law purports to ban all large religious symbols being worn in state schools. Hence Sikhs, 
Jews and Muslims will have a strong argument under the Mandla case law that such legislation 
constitutes racial discrimination against them on grounds of ethnic origins.  
The French government can argue that the law is non-discriminatory in that it applies to all large 
religious symbols being worn in school.
11 However, the principal effect of that argument is to 
shift the legal challenge from direct to indirect discrimination, where the French government 
would still have to justify its prohibition under the directive as objectively justified by a legitimate 
aim.
12 Arguments concerning, for example, public order or public safety would have to be 
objectively justified in respect of the ban on all religious symbols. The French government may 
find this argument difficult to sustain. It is hard to see how a public order or public safety 
argument could be justified for a ban on all large religious symbols. 
What is not at all clear is the extent to which the Community courts would give credence to the 
principle of secularism as an objectively justified legitimate aim under the directive. One 
difficulty for the French government is that unlike the Strasbourg Human Rights Court, the EJC is 
likely to undertake a much more intensive investigation of such an aim as secularism. In 
particular, it may well take a close look at the extent to which the French state breaches its own 
secularist principles. For example, the argument to the effect that the French state cannot rely on 
the principle of secularism because in practice the state does in fact support private schools where 
the religious symbols, such as headscarves, skull caps and crosses are worn. The intensive 
investigation carried out by the ECJ is likely to make it more difficult for the French government 
to sustain the argument that the secularism principle is a legitimate aim sufficient to justify the 
                                                 
7 Ibid. 
8 Seide v. Gillette Industries Ltd [1980] IRLR 427. 
9 JH Walker v. Hussain [1996] ICR 291. 
10 Dobe, K.S. and Chhokar, S.S. (2000), “Muslims, Ethnicity and the Law”, International Journal of 
Discrimination and the Law, Vol. 4, 369-86. 
11 See the argument on discriminatory application of the law below. 
12 Art 2(2)(b) of Directive 2000/43 provides that ‘indirect direct discrimination shall be taken to occur where an 
apparently neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a racial or ethnic origin at a particular 
disadvantage compared with other persons unless that provision, criterion or practice is objectively justified by a 
legitimate aim and the means of achieving that aim are appropriate and necessary’. 4 | ALAN RILEY 
 
prohibition of large religious symbols in schools.
13 Challengers to the ban can also point out that 
the French secularist principles are not even uniformly applied within the territory of Metropolitan 
France in that secularism does not apply in Alsace-Moselle. In fact in that region the state directly 
supports public religious schools.
14 
The ECJ is also like to be heavily influenced by the case law of the other superior and supreme 
courts of the member states. The most recent notable discussion before a European superior court 
was before the Bundesverfassungsgericht, the German Federal Constitutional Court, which 
discussed the scope for secularist principles in the context of a headscarf ban applied to a school 
teacher.
15 Although the Court took a procedural approach to settling the case – ruling that express 
legal rules were required by the Lander for any ban to apply – the discussion of the 
Bundesverfassungsgericht raises a number of relevant issues.  
The Court took the view that the wearing of clothing such as headscarves only unfolded a 
meaning in conjunction with the person who wears such clothing. In its view decisive as to how 
such garments are to be understood is the view of the neutral observer. The Court also took the 
view that the wearing of such garments cannot be reduced to simply a sign of the suppression of 
women. It also held that the wearing of a headscarf does not in principle impede the teaching of 
the values of the German Constitution. It also argued that there is a crucial difference between 
religious symbols installed on public property on the order of the state, and the state tolerating the 
personal decision of an individual to wear a religious symbol herself. If the state tolerates such a 
symbol worn by an individual, it is not making this a symbol of its own.
16  
The ECJ is also likely to be influenced by the broad protection against religious and racial 
discrimination in many international agreements that have been ratified by the member states. In 
addition, the Court is likely to take into account, the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, 
particularly if the EU Constitution comes into force before a case arrives in Luxembourg, which 
will give legal force to the Charter. Article 10 of the Charter provides broad protection for 
freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Even if the Constitution has not come into force, the 
Court will apply fundamental rights in respect of religion as part of the general principles of 
Community law.
17 
One particular discrimination argument that may well place immense pressure on the French 
government is the argument that relates to the scope of the ban. The ban applies so that small 
religious symbols, such as crosses and stars of David, are permitted but larger religious symbols 
are not. There is thus a potentially strong discrimination argument with which the French state is 
likely to have difficulty. This would appear to be a prima facie case of indirect discrimination, 
technically neutral but bearing down on some faith communities, namely Muslims, Sikhs and 
Jews, but not others, in this case Christians. Christians, even the most devout, do not usually enter 
schools, or for that matter any other premises, even Churches, carrying large crosses. 
                                                 
13 Tim King (2004),  Secularism in France’, Prospect, No. 64, March. 
14 When the secularist law was adopted in 1905, the region of Alsace-Moselle was part of Germany. The German 
state applied the Napoleonic Concordat of 1808 which gave the Catholic and other churches, as well as Jewish 
organisations directly state-supported schools and priests, pastors and rabbis paid by the state. After the return of 
the region to France, all French governments since have foresworn secularist principles and honoured the 1808 
Concordat. 
15 BverG, 2BvR 1436/02, 24 September 2003. 
16 Mattias Mahlmann (2003), “Religious Tolerance, Pluralist Society and the Neutrality of the State: The Federal 
Constitutional Court’s Decision in the Headscarf Case”, German Law Journal , Vol. 4, No. 11. 
17 Case 130/75 Prais v. Council [1976] ECR 1589. In that case the ECJ held that there was a violation of the 
right to religious freedom, recognised as a general principle of Community law. A Jewish job applicant was 
required to take an examination on a Saturday and, as a result of her religious obligations, she was precluded 
from applying for a week-day job. HEADSCARVES, SKULL CAPS AND CROSSES – THE EUROPEAN LEGALITY OF THE FRENCH BAN | 5 
 
As explained above, an alternative legal basis to challenge the French law stems from Directive 
2000/78/EC, which would permit a direct challenge on grounds of religious discrimination. 
However, that challenge would be limited by the scope of the directive to colleges where 
vocational training took place. The French government, however, is equally likely to find some 
difficulty in justifying the ban on religious symbols within the scope of Directive 2000/78 as it 
will under Directive 2000/43. The ECJ has already held that religious freedom is a general 
principle of Community law. Furthermore, as pointed out above, religious freedom also receives 
broad protection under Article 10 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights. And again unlike the 
ECHR system where the states are given a margin of discretion (in Convention terms 
appreciation) in assessing what interferences are justified, Community law requires strict 
objective justification of interference with Community rights.  
The European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR) 
The Convention case law is likely to provide significantly less protection against the French 
prohibition on religious symbols. In part this is because of the margin of appreciation given to the 
Contracting States of the ECHR in enacting and enforcing the laws of their respective states. In 
part because the existing case law has taken, compared with the case law of the superior courts of 
the member states, a notably unreflective approach to similar questions as those raised by the 
French law. However, Articles 9 and 14 are likely to still provide France with some problematic 
legal issues to overcome. 
Article 9 of the Convention protects two rights.
18 The first is the right to hold and change religious 
beliefs. This right is absolutely protected under Article 9. The second protected right is the right to 
manifest religious beliefs. This however is subject to restrictions under Article 9(2) by such 
limitations that are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of 
public order, health or morals or for the protection of rights and freedoms of others.
19 
At first sight the French government has a very powerful case that it can legitimately impose a 
ban on religious symbols being worn by pupils on state school premises. In the first place the 
ECtHR has made it clear that the states have a margin of appreciation to balance the religious 
freedom of one party or group against the religious freedoms and freedom of conscience of others. 
This margin of appreciation would appear to give the French government sufficient discretion to 
control the type of clothing and religious symbols to be worn in French schools. In particular, the 
government can argue the ban is proportionate, and does not step outside its margin of 
appreciation, as it affects all religious symbols, and does not discriminate against any one religion. 
Secondly, the Strasbourg-based Commission of Human Rights in Karaduman v. Turkey ruled as 
inadmissible a case in which a university student had refused to remove her headscarf in order to 
obtain a degree certificate.
20 In that case, the Commission took the view that a student joining a 
                                                 
18 Article 9 of the ECHR provides: 
“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion, this right includes freedom to change 
his religion or belief and freedom, either alone, or in community with others and in public or private, to manifest 
his religion or belief, in worship, teaching, practice and observance. 
2. Freedom to manifest one’s religion or beliefs shall be subject only to such limitations as are prescribed by law 
and are necessary in a democratic society in the interests of public safety, for the protection of public order, 
health or morals, or for the protection of rights and freedom of others.” 
19 Claims under Article 9 are often also made alongside claims under the right of freedom of expression 
contained in Article 10 and freedom of assembly contained in Article 11. Article 9 claims can also be bundled 
with an ancillary claim under Article 14 which protects holders of Convention rights from discrimination. 
20  Karaduman v. Turkey (1993) Application No. 16278/90. Application before the Commission of Human 
Rights. 6 | ALAN RILEY 
 
secular institution could be obliged to comply with the rules of that institution. The Commission 
also pointed to the rights and freedoms of the other students not to be pressured into wearing the 
headscarf. 
Thirdly, in the recent Dahlab v. Switzerland case, the Court expressly upheld, as justified under 
Article 9(2), a ban on the Islamic headscarf being worn by a teacher in a state infant school, and 
ruled inadmissible.
21 
It is unfortunate that so far no case has reached a full chamber of the European Court of Human 
Rights. The Karaduman case, while being only a Commission case, is particularly problematic. 
No account was taken of whether any other educational institutional was available nor whether 
there was indeed any pressure on students at the University to wear the headscarf. Given the 
developed law in other jurisdictions since Karduman, particularly the arguments that could be 
derived from the recent case in the Bundesverfassungsgericht, it is open to question how far a ban 
on religious symbols being worn by students would survive an ECHR legal challenge. 
Furthermore, the detail of the ruling in Dahlab suggests that the position of the French state is not 
as secure as it first appears. The ECtHR accepted that the ban was proportionate and that the 
Swiss state did not exceed its margin of appreciation under Article 9(2). The Court argued that the 
measures taken by Switzerland were justified given the role of Ms Dahlab as a state school 
teacher, exercising educational authority and representing the state and the tender age of the 
children for whom she was responsible. 
The difficulty for the French state is that the entire focus of the Court’s acceptance on a restriction 
of Ms Dahlab’s religious freedom was based on her position as a superior, able to influence her 
charges. That basis for a restriction is not available to France in relation to its ban on religious 
symbols. Worse still, the Court has previously used this ‘superior’ distinction as the basis of 
holding that a restriction on religious freedom is justified, and where the same religious freedom 
did not involve the exercise of such a freedom by a superior, then a similar restriction was deemed 
to have infringed Article 9. 
In Kokkinakis v. Greece,
22 the Court had ruled that a conviction for prosyletism infringed Article 
9. In Lariss v. Greece,
23 the applicant had been also convicted of prosyletism. However, in that 
case, the applicant had been a superior in the Greek army who had sought to prosyeltise his 
subordinates. The Court took the view that restrictions on prosyletism by army superiors were 
justified under the Convention as a proportionate response to protect subordinates.  
Without the ‘superior’ element present, it is likely to be more difficult for the French government 
to sustain its prohibition against schoolchildren wearing religious symbols under Article 9. One 
approach for the French government would be to rely on some of the public order and public 
safety justifications in Article 9(2). France could argue that the right to wear religious symbols 
pressures other students to conform, restricting their own right to religious liberty. However, there 
is the question of evidence for this proposition. The Bundesverfassungsgericht indicated that there 
was very little research on this issue of the impact of religious clothing on schoolchildren.
24 There 
is also the question of whether any blanket ban would be proportionate. It could be argued for 
instance that a ban could be justified to protect the religious freedom of younger children but 
could it be justified on older teenagers who would be less impressionable and have a significant 
degree of personal autonomy in their lives at such an age. 
                                                 
21 Dahlab v. Switzerland (2001) Application No. 42393/98. 
22 Kokkinkas v. Greece (1993) EHRR 397. 
23 Lariss v. Greece (1998) EHRR 329. 
24 Mahlmann, op. cit., 1105.  HEADSCARVES, SKULL CAPS AND CROSSES – THE EUROPEAN LEGALITY OF THE FRENCH BAN | 7 
 
The greatest difficulty for France is likely to be in respect of the scope of the ban. If small 
religious symbols are permitted, then the French government is likely to find it difficult to justify 
the ban. As explained above, the challengers to the ban will be able to argue that the ban is in fact 
discriminatory. Additionally such challengers will be able to rely upon Article 14 of the 
Convention, which prohibits discrimination that occurs within the ambit of Convention rights.
25 
Conclusion: A prohibition under pressure? 
It is almost certain that as soon as the law banning religious symbols in schools comes into force 
it will face a legal challenge in the French courts. It is almost as certain that the challengers will 
rely on EC law to challenge the prohibition. As explained above the EC law argument is likely to 
be stronger; in addition, a result can be obtained from the ECJ faster than the Strasbourg Court. A 
first instance national court can refer the issues involved in the case to the ECJ, there is no need to 
send the case spiralling up the national judicial hierarchy. In addition, if the ECJ rules against the 
ban, the national courts will directly overturn the ban, without need of government intervention. 
By contrast, the arguments are not only weaker under the Convention case law, the process to be 
heard in Strasbourg is slower and if the Court ruled against the French government there is no 
mechanism to ensure direct application of the Court’s ruling in France. Therefore the 
overwhelming focus of the legal debate is likely to be on EC law. Hence the French ban is likely 
to provide the newly re-constituted court of 25 judges in Luxembourg an early opportunity to rule 
on the scope and substance of the Race Discrimination Directive. 
                                                 
25 Article 14 provides that “the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention shall be secured 
without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language, religion or political or other opinion, 
national or social origin, associated with a minority, property birth or other status”.  
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